intersectional analysis of the Voting Rights Act that illuminates challenges that persist for women of color following the Shelby v. Holder (2013) decision.

The role that race plays within women’s political history is carefully documented throughout the volume. This intersectional approach clearly illustrates the tragedy of the racism present in the first wave of the women’s movement, as well as how this historical damage continues to have consequences for today’s social movements and politicians. Montoya’s chapter, in particular, might inspire another volume that would take a similarly intersectional approach to the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

In the second section, scholars consider women’s collective action and take on the question of whether the wave metaphor accurately captures women’s political activity. This section in particular looks at women’s mobilization around feminism and gender equality. It specifically considers how women have advocated for themselves since the Nineteenth Amendment, sometimes through traditional political means but sometimes with their own unique strategies. These chapters consider the whole hundred-year time span with significant insights into the history of feminism and how it characterizes our present.

In one chapter, for example, Laura K. Nelson traces the history of feminists rather than suffragists more narrowly from the 1910s until today, demonstrating that the personal politics of hashtags and online communities is not a degeneration of the feminist movement but, rather, characteristic of a political consciousness raising that has always played a part in feminist development. The other chapters in this section look at more traditional political practice, including Kristin Goss’s impressive congressional data set of testimony between 1880 and 2000 that addresses the question of whether or not women’s policy activism died between the first- and second-wave feminist movements. A third chapter by Tracey Jean Boisseau and Tracey A. Thomas revisits the history of the equal rights amendment, illustrating the differences among women on the constitutional amendment meant to ensure that “equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex.”

If anything, this section left me wanting more. With only three chapters, it was not on balance with the other two. Additional chapters might have covered more specifically the development of the third-wave women’s movement, womanism, or other such breaks deserving of historical introspection on their connection with the establishment of voting rights.

In the final section, authors present evidence of the wide-ranging influence of women on movements and causes beyond gender equality, and discuss how women’s inclusion into these movement narratives changes the history we think we know about environmentalism, nonviolence, white supremacy, Civil Rights, and economic inequality. This section is critical for understanding how the Nineteenth Amendment affected not only women’s political history but also our shared American history.

Within this section, Selina Gallo-Cruz uses scholarly accounts of women in social movements, interviews with activists, and archival materials to establish the history of women’s implementation of nonviolence in political movements. In another chapter, Kathleen Blee documents the role of women in white supremacist movements before and since suffrage, particularly important in today’s political climate in which the political behavior of white women is credited with enabling President Donald Trump’s rise to power, a rise that included multiple racist appeals.

I commend the editors for gathering such a range of approaches to women’s political engagement over the last hundred years. Beyond its substantive impact, the volume is an incredibly rich display of feminist methodological innovation and would be valuable to political methodologists everywhere. The women’s history documented here at once illustrates the great victories of political women as it also reminds us of the challenges that remain. The editors reassert the chorus of feminist institutionalists within social science that politics and political institutions are and have always been gendered.


Within political science, and especially within the study of American politics, religion is typically treated as an independent variable that arises through means
exogenous to politics. Students of public opinion and voting behavior, for example, often include religious identity or participation as an explanatory variable shaping a person’s party affiliation, attitudes on political issues, and choices in elections. Religious interest groups, meanwhile, work from preexisting theological understandings when advocating for their causes. Some scholars have begun complicating this religion-to-politics paradigm in recent years, but none so powerfully as Michele F. Margolis in her book *From Politics to the Pews*. While acknowledging that a person’s religion can sometimes influence how he or she thinks and acts politically, especially in the presence of cues received within religious communities, Margolis stresses the reverse process, whereby politics affects whether and how religious identities develop.

The book is a model work of political science in that it draws from existing knowledge while managing to advance and defend a novel thesis. Sociologists of religion have long known that people (in the United States, at least) are typically raised with some exposure to religion but turn to other pursuits during late adolescence and early adulthood as they move away from home, enter the labor force, pursue higher education, and/or begin romantic relationships. Many people then return to the religious tradition of their childhood, or find another one, after getting married and having children. Margolis takes these patterns as her starting point for showing how politics can drive a person’s religious commitments. Because partisan identities generally form and solidify in early adulthood, she argues, they can influence whether or not people increase their levels of religious activity in subsequent years.

The backdrop to Margolis’s research is the fact that elites within the two major American parties have taken contrasting positions on religiously infused issues since the late 1970s. The Republican Party has become the home of evangelicals and Catholics who hold conservative views on abortion, gay rights, and other “culture war” issues, while the Democratic Party has attracted the religiously unaffiliated and those who support a strong separation of church and state. The author’s contribution is to show that persons who are already Republicans will be more likely (upon getting married and having children) to seek out a church where they can find like-minded congregants. Democrats, conversely, will be less likely to do so even if they were raised in a religious tradition because they often do not perceive churches as welcoming of people like them. These behavioral patterns then persist into middle age and beyond. Religious participation is thus profoundly affected by the larger political environment at key moments of a person’s life.

To support her causal claims, Margolis taps several different data sources and employs a variety of analytic techniques. Perhaps her most important data come from the Youth-Parent Socialization Panel, initially collected by M. Kent Jennings and Richard Niemi in 1965, with follow-up surveys of the same respondents in 1973, 1982, and 1997. The data include people who were high-school seniors in 1965 and their parents. Republicans and Democrats in 1965 were equally likely to have been raised in a religious home, and by 1973, when they were young adults, they had decreased their levels of church attendance at equal rates. However, Republicans reengaged with religion at a higher rate than Democrats did by 1982, when most of the subjects were ages 34–35. That effect was concentrated among people who were married and had children, just as Margolis predicted.

In one of the strongest features of the book, the author works to address every possible objection to her conclusions. How can politics drive religious identification, given that many people do not pay much attention to politics and do not know the parties’ stances on matters connected to religion? Margolis shows that the effects she describes can be easily detected within the population as a whole, but are strongest among those with the highest levels of political knowledge, who presumably know the parties’ reputations and issue positions, while shrinking to zero among those with the lowest levels of political knowledge. Is it not possible that the observational data on which she relies is somehow blocking her ability to tease apart the causal relationships? She answers that concern by corroborating her findings through a survey experiment performed on a national sample. When primed with an innocuous flyer mentioning the person’s party, the strength of religious affiliation became stronger for Republicans and weaker for Democrats, but only among respondents whose religious identities are in flux: people with children at home. Similar results emerged after priming people with a news story about Republican presidential candidates courting the Religious Right.

Finally, what about African Americans, who have high rates of religious commitment and church attendance but maintain allegiance to the Democratic Party? In a persuasive chapter, Margolis demonstrates that there is no contradiction here. African Americans disproportionately attend churches in the black Protestant tradition that stress social justice issues rather than the culture war issues of white evangelicals. Because the Democratic Party holds more favorable stances on the issues of greatest concern to them, African Americans see no conflict between their partisan and religious affiliations. As a result, African American Democrats show the same pattern as white Republicans in turning away from religion during late adolescence and early adulthood while commonly returning to it in subsequent years. Margolis also does an exemplary job in assessing the generalizability of her theory. The parties of the last three decades have taken distinctive stands on matters of interest to various religious groups, but her theory does...
not depend on any particular alignment of party positions. Any connection of the parties with religious matters will lead partisans in the electorate to change their religious identities in corresponding ways. To show that connection, Margolis includes a chapter examining the 1960 presidential election, where considerable national attention focused on John F. Kennedy’s status as a Catholic. If her theory is generalizable, that linkage should have affected the religious expression of ordinary people—and it did. By comparison to the previous few years, Democratic and Republican Catholics became more and less likely, respectively, to attend church. The opposite effect held for Democratic and Republican Protestants.

Margolis is aware, of course, that the United States contains members of many non-Christian religions, but they do not show up in sufficient numbers in national surveys for her to study them separately. She has nevertheless made a signal contribution to an understanding of the intersection of religion and politics in America. No longer will political scientists be able to treat religion as an independent variable untainted by the political environment. By showing that the reality is more complicated and, frankly, more interesting, From Politics to the Pew will take its place among the instant classics in the field.


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Since the 1970s, researchers have studied the electoral advantages of congressional incumbents, advantages that may be offset if “quality challengers”—experienced politicians—run against them. These quality challengers make strategic decisions whether to enter a race or not, and their decisions are based, in part, on the expectation that voters will punish incumbents for poor representation. Jamie L. Carson and Joel Sievert’s new book asks whether this model of strategic electoral representation applies to an earlier period of American history. In doing so, it asks fundamental questions about representation in nineteenth-century America: Did elections allow citizens a meaningful opportunity to choose members of the U.S. House of Representatives? Did it matter who ran for Congress? Could citizens punish legislators for poor representation?

Nineteenth-century elections provide a difficult test for contemporary models of congressional elections. There is ample previous research indicating that the use of party-list ballots prevented citizens from voting for or against individual candidates, while Congress made many policy decisions during “lame duck” congressional sessions held after the elections for the next Congress. Furthermore, during the decades before the adoption of primary elections, parties chose candidates in nominating conventions. In many sections of the country, parties adopted a norm of rotation in office, which means that parties nominated politicians for one or two terms per office. In this system, scholars have argued, members of the U.S. House had little opportunity to develop personal reputations, and citizens had little opportunity to reward or punish incumbents.

In order to test whether contemporary models of elections help us understand a different historical context, Carson and Sievert (in a chapter co-authored with Jeffrey A. Jenkins drawing on Jamie Carson and Jeffery Jenkins, “Examining the Electoral Connection Across Time,” Annual Review of Political Science, 14, 2011) first generalize the conditions for an effective citizen control of their representatives: (1) Most politicians are politically ambitious, either seeking reelection to the same office or a different elected position; (2) politicians enjoy meaningful autonomy, deciding whether to run for office and campaigning independently of a party organization; (3) politicians are able to be individually responsive by taking personal positions and claiming personal credit for legislative action; and (4) voters can hold their own members of Congress accountable for their actions. The book then tests whether these four conditions are met during the nineteenth century.

Carson and Sievert provide ample evidence of politicians’ ambition and autonomy. Chapter 4 finds that from 1820 to 1888, experienced politicians were more likely to run for open congressional seats, while incumbents were less likely to face challengers with previous political experience from 1840 to 1888. These decisions affected election outcomes; in asymmetric elections where one U.S. House candidate was experienced (including incumbents) and the opposing candidate was not, voter turnout tended to decrease while the vote share of the more experienced candidate was generally higher.

The book also provides evidence that voters could hold House members accountable during the nineteenth century. Chapter 6 argues that the use of party tickets did not completely insulate legislators from popular judgment. House members who were effective and popular could be renominated by their party to improve the attractiveness of the overall ticket. Furthermore, House incumbents who were excluded from the “official” party ticket could organize an alternative ticket to distribute at the polls, thereby circumventing the party’s control over nominations. Finally, Chapter 6 argues that the variability of election timing allowed House members to separate their elections from more salient elections (especially for president and governor), with the support of state officials. Even when presidential and congressional election dates were synchronized, experienced legislators provided a boost for their party tickets, all else being equal.