Online appendix A: TAPS panel data

Classification of white evangelicals

Steensland et al. (2000) classifies American religious denominations into six nominal groups: mainline Protestant, evangelical Protestant, black Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, and other (e.g., Mormon, Jehovah's Witness, Muslim, Hindu, etc). The authors use theological criteria from denominational creeds and associational information as well as historical information to classify religious denominations into one of these broader categories. The authors show that this classification offers an improvement over previous classification schemes with respect to its model fit across a host of demographic characteristics and social attitudes. Steensland et al. (2000) also critique earlier classification schemes, which rely on members' doctrines and beliefs to classify respondents along a fundamentalist-liberal continuum. To date, Steensland et al.'s classification scheme has been cited 1,046 times.

The following is a complete list of the denominations categorized as evangelical Protestant, which have associated themselves with fundamentalist, Pentecostal, charismatic, or evangelical religious movements: American Baptist Association; Baptist, don'tknow which; Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod; Other Baptist Churches; Other Lutheran Churches; Other Methodist Churches; Other Presbyterian Churches; Southern Baptist Convention; Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod; Advent Christian; Amist; Apostolic Christian; Assembly of God; Bible Missionary; Brethren Church, Brethren, Plymouth; Brother of Christ; Calvary Bible; Chapel of Faith; Charismatic; Chinese Gospel Church; Christ Cathedral of Truth; Christ Church Unity; Christian and Missionary Alliance; Christian Calvary Chapel; Christian Catholic; Christian; Central Christian; Christian Reformed; Christ in Christian Union; Christ in God; Churches of God (except with Christ and Holiness); Church of Christ; Church of Christ, Evangelical; Church of Daniel's Band; The Church of God of Prophecy; Church of Prophecy; Church of the First Born; Church of the Living God; Community Church; Covenant; Dutch Reformed; Evangelical Congregational; Evangelical Covenant;

Evangelical, Evangelist; Evangelical Free Church; Evangelical Methodist; Evangelical United Brethren; Faith Christian; Faith Gospel Tabernacle; First Christian; Four Square Gospel; Free Methodist; Free Will Baptist; Full Gospel; Grace Brethren; Holiness Church of God; Holiness (Nazarene); Holy Roller; Independent; Independent Bible, Bible, Bible Fellowship; Independent Fundamental Church of America; Laotian Christian; Living Word; Macedonia; Mennonite; Mennonite Brethren; Missionary Baptist; Missionary Church; Mission Covenant; Nazarene; New Testament Christian; Open Bible; Other Fundamentalist; Pentacostal; Pentacostal Assembly of God; Pentecostal Holinees, Holiness Pentecostal; People's Church; Pilgrim Holiness; Primitive Baptist; Salvation Amry; Seventh Day Adventist; Swedish Mission; Triumph Church of God; The Way Ministry; Wesleyan; Wesleyan Methodist-Pilgrim.

## White evangelicals' immigration attitudes over time

I present the raw results graphically to show trends without making any modeling assumptions. The left panel of Figure A1 presents the immigration opinions of white evangelicals between February 2013 and February 2014, while the right panel presents the same opinion data for everyone else, or all those who are not white evangelicals. The circular points and solid lines represent the percentage of respondents who support–either strongly or somewhat–immigration reform. The square points and dashed lines represent the percentage of respondents who neither support nor oppose immigration reform. And finally, the triangles and dotted lines represent the percentage of respondents who oppose, both somewhat and strongly, immigration reform.[1] The lines connecting each set of points is the best fit line between the two waves of data and the vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

These data offer two important insights. First, a solid majority of white evangelicals (60%) in wave 1 either somewhat or strongly opposed allowing immigrants currently in

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[1]I collapse the codes for ease of presentation. Replicating the analyses using the full five-point scale produces similar results.

the country without proper documentation to remain legally, and, when looking across the two panels, far fewer white evangelicals supported immigration reform in February 2013 compared to the rest of the country. Second, white evangelicals' attitudes toward reform changed between February 2013 and 2014. Opposition decreased from 60% in wave 1, to 58% in wave 2, and again to 52% in wave 3. The shifts among white evangelicals is contrasted with the attitudes of the rest of the public which remained markedly stable over the year (right panel of Figure 1).[2]

Figure A1: Evangelical immigration attitudes changed over time

White evangelicals   Everyone except white evangelicals

Note: The graphs plot immigration attitudes over time along with a line of best fit between each wave. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

I next build on the graphical results using parametric tests. Here, the dependent variable is the five-point measure of immigration reform support, ranging from 0 (strong opposition) to 100 (strong support). The inclusion of control variables does not change the results from the parsimonious model in column 1. In each specification, white evangelicals take a stronger anti-reform stance relative to those who are not white evangelicals, but this gap becomes smaller over the course of a year. Small changes found between waves 1 and 2 are accompanied by substantively meaningful and statistically significant shifts in attitudes

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[2]The percentages of pro-reform respondents are 48%, 45%, and 47%, respectively. The percentages of neutral respondents are 21%, 23%, and 21%, and the percentages of anti-reform respondents are 31%, 32%, and 33%.

between waves 1 and 3. In the first four model specifications, white evangelicals remain more opposed to immigration reform than others in wave 3 despite larger shifts in the pro-reform direction. While white evangelicals narrowed the gap between themselves and non-evangelicals, the gap still existed. The final column, which controls for both partisanship and political ideology, shows that the gap between white evangelicals and other religious faiths actually disappears in wave 3.[3]

Table A1: White evangelicals became more supportive of reform over time

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
White evangelicals - not white evangelicals					
Wave 1	-18**	-15**	-15**	-15**	-7*
(standard error)	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)
Wave 2	-15**	-12**	-11**	-11**	-4
(standard error)	(5)	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)
Wave 3	-11**	-9**	-8**	-8**	0
(standard error)	(5)	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)
Change in religion gap over time					
Between Wave 1 and 2 (β_4)	4	4	4	4	3
(standard error)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)
Between Wave 1 and 3 (β_5)	7**	7*	6*	7*	6*
(standard error)	(4)	(3)	(3)	(4)	(4)
Controls					
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Perceptions of economy	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Feelings toward immigrant groups	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Politics	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	1795	1795	1795	1795	1795

Notes: The dependent variable is a five-point measure of immigration reform support ranging from strongly oppose immigration reform (0) to strongly support immigration reform (100). The coefficients are OLS estimates. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. "Demographics" include: gender, race, age, age-squared, education, income, and county-level Hispanic presence (measured by percent Hispanic in county and percent Hispanic in county squared). "Economic perceptions" include a question about one's personal financial situation and the financial situation of the country as a whole. "Feelings" include respondents'

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[3]Model 5 likely suffers from post-treatment bias if evangelicals are more likely to become Republicans and/or conservatives. Consequently, the gaps between evangelicals and the rest of the sample may be artificially small. While it is therefore important to take the size of the religious gaps with caution, it is comforting that I find the same interactive results when political controls are included.

feeling thermometer scores toward Hispanics and Asians. "Politics" include respondents' party identification and political ideology. * = p<0.1 ** = p<0.05

Table A2: White evangelicals became more supportive of immigration reform over time (data same as Table A1)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Wave 2	3.83	0.43	26.32**	25.27*	28.84**	28.93**
	(2.46)	(1.43)	(12.02)	(13.54)	(14.23)	(14.07)
Wave 3	5.59**	-0.36	1.98	-5.80	-3.26	-3.63
	(2.74)	(1.85)	(20.42)	(18.89)	(19.02)	(18.87)
White evangelical		-18.36**	-15.20**	-14.72**	-14.73**	-6.87*
		(4.30)	(3.87)	(3.84)	(3.72)	(3.98)
Wave 2 * White evangelical		3.72	3.53	3.58	3.99	2.84
		(3.14)	(2.93)	(2.86)	(2.90)	(3.16)
Wave 3 * White evangelical		7.02**	6.52*	6.38*	6.64*	6.38*
		(3.57)	(3.52)	(3.53)	(3.57)	(3.70)
Intercept	33.43**	54.38**	33.17**	33.04**	17.16	47.66**
	(2.92)	(1.99)	(15.26)	(16.07)	(16.42)	(16.16)
Demographics	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Perceptions of economy	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Feelings toward immigrant groups	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Politics	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
R^2	0.006	0.038	0.138	0.154	0.182	0.282
Observations	529	1795	1795	1795	1795	1795

Notes: The dependent variable is a five-point measure of immigration reform support ranging from strongly oppose immigration reform (0) to strongly support immigration reform (100). The coefficients are OLS estimates. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The sample in Column 1 is restricted to white evangelicals only. Columns 2 through 6 include all respondents. "Demographics" include: gender, race, age, age-squared, education, income, and county-level Hispanic presence (measured by percent Hispanic in county and percent Hispanic in county squared). "Economic perceptions" include a question about one's personal financial situation and the financial situation of the country as a whole. "Feelings" include respondents' feeling thermometer scores toward Hispanics and Asians. "Politics" include respondents' party identification and political ideology. All control variables are interacted with wave variables to allow for effects to vary over time. * = p<0.1 ** = p<0.05

Table A3: White evangelicals became more supportive of immigration reform over time (alternative specification 1 of county-level Hispanic presence)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Wave 2	3.83	0.43	27.22**	25.48**	28.64**	30.17**
	(2.46)	(1.43)	(11.18)	(12.90)	(13.28)	(13.15)
Wave 3	5.59**	-0.36	1.18	-6.49	-3.21	-1.89
	(2.74)	(1.85)	(20.10)	(18.44)	(18.44)	(18.72)
White evangelical		-18.36**	-14.07**	-13.41**	-13.78**	-5.47
		(4.30)	(4.09)	(4.08)	(4.02)	(4.04)
Wave 2 * White evangelical		3.72	2.55	2.94	3.60	2.24
		(3.14)	(2.91)	(2.89)	(2.99)	(3.15)
Wave 3 * White evangelical		7.02**	6.30*	6.30*	7.01**	6.47*
		(3.57)	(3.29)	(3.35)	(3.41)	(3.54)
Intercept	33.43**	54.38**	58.30*	56.30*	34.70	71.19**
	(2.92)	(1.99)	(30.55)	(31.22)	(28.34)	(24.37)
Demographics	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Perceptions of economy	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Feelings toward immigrant groups	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Politics	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
R^2	0.006	0.038	0.174	0.189	0.217	0.316
Observations	529	1795	1795	1795	1795	1795

Notes: The dependent variable is a five-point measure of immigration reform support ranging from strongly oppose immigration reform (0) to strongly support immigration reform (100). The coefficients are OLS estimates. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The sample in Column 1 is restricted to white evangelicals only. Columns 2 through 6 include all respondents. "Demographics" include: gender, race, age, age-squared, education, income, and **county-level Hispanic presence (measured by percent-Hispanic deciles. Deciles are treated as binary variables.)**. "Economic perceptions" include a question about one's personal financial situation and the financial situation of the country as a whole. "Feelings" include respondents' feeling thermometer scores toward Hispanics and Asians. "Politics" include respondents' party identification and political ideology. All control variables are interacted with wave variables to allow for effects to vary over time. * = p<0.1 ** = p<0.05

Table A4: White evangelicals became more supportive of immigration reform over time (alternative specification 2 of county-level Hispanic presence)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Wave 2	3.83	0.43	30.49**	29.26**	32.70**	33.71**
	(2.46)	(1.43)	(12.45)	(14.10)	(14.74)	(14.67)
Wave 3	5.59**	-0.36	8.94	1.20	3.47	3.08
	(2.74)	(1.85)	(19.34)	(18.16)	(18.45)	(18.27)
White evangelical		-18.36**	-15.70**	-15.19**	-15.22**	-6.96*
		(4.30)	(3.88)	(3.87)	(3.78)	(4.01)
Wave 2 * White evangelical		3.72	3.41	3.45	3.86	2.68
		(3.14)	(2.94)	(2.86)	(2.90)	(3.14)
Wave 3 * White evangelical		7.02**	6.34*	6.14*	6.41*	6.10
		(3.57)	(3.53)	(3.53)	(3.58)	(3.70)
Intercept	33.43**	54.38**	31.33*	31.49*	16.55	48.59**
	(2.92)	(1.99)	(16.02)	(16.45)	(16.96)	(16.85)
Demographics	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Perceptions of economy	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Feelings toward immigrant groups	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Politics	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
R^2	0.006	0.038	0.133	0.149	0.176	0.282
Observations	529	1795	1795	1795	1795	1795

Notes: The dependent variable is a five-point measure of immigration reform support ranging from strongly oppose immigration reform (0) to strongly support immigration reform (100). The coefficients are OLS estimates. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The sample in Column 1 is restricted to white evangelicals only. Columns 2 through 6 include all respondents. "Demographics" include: gender, race, age, age-squared, education, income, and **county-level Hispanic presence (measured by percent-Hispanic deciles. Deciles are treated as a continuous variable.)**. "Economic perceptions" include a question about one's personal financial situation and the financial situation of the country as a whole. "Feelings" include respondents' feeling thermometer scores toward Hispanics and Asians. "Politics" include respondents' party identification and political ideology. All control variables are interacted with wave variables to allow for effects to vary over time. * = p<0.1 ** = p<0.05

Table A1 presents the main quantities of interest. Column 1 presents a parsimonious model without control variables, the first three rows of which show the mean difference in immigration attitudes for white evangelicals compared to those who are not white evangelicals for each survey wave. In all cases, the negative differences reiterate that white evangelicals are, on average, more opposed to immigration reform relative to those who are not white evangelicals. The size of this gap, however, shrinks over time. In wave 1, there is an 18-point difference in immigration support. This gap represents nearly a full response option on the scale, such as moving from weak support to strong support, or from weak opposition to neither support nor oppose. The attitude gap becomes smaller over time, and by wave 3 the gap has decreased to 11 points, representing a difference of half a response option. I present the interactions from the model specified above in the subsequent two rows. Between waves 1 and 2, white evangelicals became slightly more supportive of immigration reform compared to others ($\beta_5 = 4$, se = 3), but these results do not reach statistical significance. Between waves 1 and 3, however, the change in immigration attitudes differed more noticeably between the two groups ($\beta_5 = 7$, se = 4). By wave 3, white evangelicals had moved 7 points–representing 7% of the attitudinal scale–in the pro-reform direction relative to those who are not white evangelicals. Consistent with the raw results, evangelicals' attitudes not only changed over time, but their shift was more dramatic than other religious groups in the sample.

Table A2 presents the regression coefficients from the interaction model that produced Table A1, and Tables A3 and A4 replicate the results using different measures of county-level Hispanic presence.

Table A5: White evangelical Republicans became more supportive of immigration reform over time (Republican subsample only; data sample as Table 1 in main text)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Wave 2	4.51	1.29	12.55	5.19	13.43	13.61
	(2.91)	(2.30)	(18.49)	(18.28)	(18.79)	(21.39)
Wave 3	9.65**	-2.07	-24.14	-27.04	-22.96	-13.65
	(3.24)	(3.03)	(32.62)	(34.72)	(33.43)	(32.77)
White evangelical		-6.21	-6.03	-5.59	-6.04	-4.13
		(5.74)	(4.39)	(4.43)	(4.53)	(4.46)
Wave 2 * White evangelical		3.92	1.76	2.60	3.38	2.59
		(4.06)	(4.14)	(4.25)	(4.20)	(4.27)
Wave 3 * White evangelical		13.82**	12.18**	12.02**	12.49**	12.88**
		(4.69)	(4.28)	(4.46)	(4.63)	(4.55)
Intercept	31.85**	39.33**	57.78**	53.52**	50.34**	57.92**
	(3.73)	(3.23)	(19.87)	(20.11)	(20.04)	(22.92)
Demographics	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Perceptions of economy	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Feelings toward immigrant groups	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Politics	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
R^2	0.016	0.009	0.176	0.191	0.194	0.225
Observations	343	789	789	789	789	789

Notes: The dependent variable is a five-point measure of immigration reform support ranging from strongly oppose immigration reform (0) to strongly support immigration reform (100). The coefficients are OLS estimates. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The sample in Column 1 is restricted to white evangelicals only. Columns 2 through 6 include all respondents. "Demographics" include: gender, race, age, age-squared, education, income, and county-level Hispanic presence (measured by percent Hispanic in county and percent Hispanic in county squared). "Economic perceptions" include a question about one's personal financial situation and the financial situation of the country as a whole. "Feelings" include respondents' feeling thermometer scores toward Hispanics and Asians. "Politics" include respondents' party identification and political ideology. All control variables are interacted with wave variables to allow for effects to vary over time. * = p<0.1 ** = p<0.05

Table A6: White evangelical Republicans became more supportive of immigration reform over time (Republican subsample only; alternative specification 1 of county-level Hispanic presence)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Wave 2	4.51	1.29	19.09	9.77	17.10	19.89
	(2.91)	(2.30)	(17.61)	(18.09)	(18.05)	(19.96)
Wave 3	9.65**	-2.07	-32.10	-34.85	-29.01	-23.40
	(3.24)	(3.03)	(32.45)	(33.99)	(32.48)	(32.45)
White evangelical		-6.21	-3.99	-4.37	-4.49	-3.10
		(5.74)	(4.92)	(5.03)	(5.24)	(5.15)
Wave 2 * White evangelical		3.92	1.35	3.32	4.39	3.44
		(4.06)	(4.14)	(4.13)	(4.23)	(4.18)
Wave 3 * White evangelical		13.82**	14.01**	13.95**	15.21**	15.32**
		(4.69)	(4.73)	(4.90)	(5.04)	(4.98)
Intercept	31.85**	39.33**	44.50*	44.48*	42.87	55.08*
	(3.73)	(3.23)	(24.58)	(26.49)	(27.09)	(31.79)
Demographics	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Perceptions of economy	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Feelings toward immigrant groups	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Politics	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
R^2	0.016	0.009	0.282	0.292	0.301	0.324
Observations	343	789	789	789	789	789

Notes: The dependent variable is a five-point measure of immigration reform support ranging from strongly oppose immigration reform (0) to strongly support immigration reform (100). The coefficients are OLS estimates. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The sample in Column 1 is restricted to white evangelicals only. Columns 2 through 6 include all respondents. "Demographics" include: gender, race, age, age-squared, education, income, and **county-level Hispanic presence (measured by percent-Hispanic deciles. Deciles are treated as binary variables.)**. "Economic perceptions" include a question about one's personal financial situation and the financial situation of the country as a whole. "Feelings" include respondents' feeling thermometer scores toward Hispanics and Asians. "Politics" include respondents' party identification and political ideology. All control variables are interacted with wave variables to allow for effects to vary over time. * = p<0.1 ** = p<0.05

Table A7: White evangelical Republicans became more supportive of immigration reform over time (Republican subsample only; alternative specification 2 of county-level Hispanic presence)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Wave 2	4.51	1.29	17.87	11.45	19.04	20.27
	(2.91)	(2.30)	(18.22)	(18.79)	(19.51)	(22.15)
Wave 3	9.65**	-2.07	-13.78	-15.47	-11.20	0.06
	(3.24)	(3.03)	(29.11)	(31.80)	(30.98)	(30.25)
White evangelical		-6.21	-6.39	-6.07	-6.51	-4.31
		(5.74)	(4.43)	(4.50)	(4.58)	(4.55)
Wave 2 * White evangelical		3.92	1.83	2.68	3.38	2.59
		(4.06)	(4.17)	(4.28)	(4.21)	(4.25)
Wave 3 * White evangelical		13.82**	12.18**	11.97**	12.46**	12.78**
		(4.69)	(4.32)	(4.47)	(4.65)	(4.53)
Intercept	31.85**	39.33**	57.35**	53.49**	50.42**	58.14**
	(3.73)	(3.23)	(19.96)	(20.20)	(20.24)	(23.35)
Demographics	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Perceptions of economy	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Feelings toward immigrant groups	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Politics	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
R^2	0.016	0.009	0.179	0.193	0.195	0.228
Observations	343	789	789	789	789	789

Notes: The dependent variable is a five-point measure of immigration reform support ranging from strongly oppose immigration reform (0) to strongly support immigration reform (100). The coefficients are OLS estimates. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The sample in Column 1 is restricted to white evangelicals only. Columns 2 through 6 include all respondents. "Demographics" include: gender, race, age, age-squared, education, income, and **county-level Hispanic presence (measured by percent-Hispanic deciles. Deciles are treated as a continuous variable.)**. "Economic perceptions" include a question about one's personal financial situation and the financial situation of the country as a whole. "Feelings" include respondents' feeling thermometer scores toward Hispanics and Asians. "Politics" include respondents' party identification and political ideology. All control variables are interacted with wave variables to allow for effects to vary over time. * = p<0.1 ** = p<0.05

Table A5 presents the regression coefficients from the interaction models presented in Table 1 in the main text of the paper. The results show how evangelical and non-evangelical Republicans' immigration attitudes diverged over time. Tables A6 and A7 replicate these results using different measures of county-level Hispanic presence.

Table A8: White evangelicals became more supportive of immigration reform over time (fixed effects model)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Wave 2 * White evangelical	3.15	3.38	3.24	3.37	2.12
	(2.20)	(2.51)	(2.52)	(2.52)	(2.65)
Wave 3 * White evangelical	6.18**	6.92**	6.53**	6.96**	6.33**
	(2.22)	(2.53)	(2.54)	(2.54)	(2.67)
Intercept	50.72**	59.24**	42.74**	27.07**	41.14**
	(0.48)	(21.91)	(12.79)	(13.76)	(11.78)
Demographics	No	Yes	No	No	No
Perceptions of economy	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Feelings toward immigrant groups	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Politics	No	No	No	No	Yes
R^2	0.007	0.032	0.037	0.045	0.051
Observations	1795	1795	1795	1795	1795

Notes: Results are from a fixed effects model. The dependent variable is a five-point measure of immigration reform support ranging from strongly oppose immigration reform (0) to strongly support immigration reform (100). The coefficients are OLS estimates. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The sample in Column 1 is restricted to white evangelicals only. Columns 2 through 6 include all respondents. "Demographics" include: gender, race, age, age-squared, education, income, and county-level Hispanic presence (measured by percent Hispanic in county and percent Hispanic in county squared). "Economic perceptions" include a question about one's personal financial situation and the financial situation of the country as a whole. "Feelings" include respondents' feeling thermometer scores toward Hispanics and Asians. "Politics" include respondents' party identification and political ideology. All control variables are interacted with wave variables to allow for effects to vary over time. * = p<0.1 ** = p<0.05

Table A9: White evangelical Republicans became more supportive of immigration reform over time (Republican subsample only; fixed effects model)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Wave 2 * White evangelical	4.69*	1.33	1.45	1.99	1.31
	(2.74)	(3.49)	(3.52)	(3.55)	(3.56)
Wave 3 * White evangelical	11.36**	10.87**	10.42**	10.70**	10.65**
	(2.81)	(3.53)	(3.56)	(3.61)	(3.62)
Intercept	37.26**	-6.44	-4.83	-9.42	3.13
	(0.81)	(30.37)	(30.63)	(30.92)	(26.32)
Demographics	No	Yes	No	No	No
Perceptions of economy	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Feelings toward immigrant groups	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Politics	No	No	No	No	Yes
R^2	0.031	0.084	0.089	0.094	0.128
Observations	789	789	789	789	789

Notes: Results are from a fixed effects model. Sample is restricted to Republicans only. The dependent variable is a five-point measure of immigration reform support ranging from strongly oppose immigration reform (0) to strongly support immigration reform (100). The coefficients are OLS estimates. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The sample in Column 1 is restricted to white evangelicals only. Columns 2 through 6 include all respondents. "Demographics" include: gender, race, age, age-squared, education, income, and county-level Hispanic presence (measured by percent Hispanic in county and percent Hispanic in county squared). "Economic perceptions" include a question about one's personal financial situation and the financial situation of the country as a whole. "Feelings" include respondents' feeling thermometer scores toward Hispanics and Asians. "Politics" include respondents' party identification and political ideology. All control variables are interacted with wave variables to allow for effects to vary over time. * = p<0.1 ** = p<0.05

Tables A8 and A9 replicate the main results using a fixed effects model for both the full sample and the Republican subsamples.

Online appendix B: EIT radio experiment

Radio transcript for religious treatment condition

NL: Christians should be known by our love. I'm Pastor Nick Lilow.

JT: And I'm Pastor Joseito Valasquez. Many of our neighbors came here seeking opportunity, but our dysfunctional immigration system breaks up families and causes suffering.

NL: Christ calls evangelicals to compassion and justice. So please join a growing movement of Christians asking our political leaders for immigration solutions rooted in biblical values that:

JT: Respect each person's God-given dignity

NL: Respect the rule of law

JT: Protect family unity

NL: Guarantee secure borders

JT: Ensure fairness to taxpayers

NL: And establish a path toward citizenship

JT: Our state of Colorado elected officials need your prayers and to hear your voice. Speak out today for common sense and just immigration laws by texting the word immigration to 877-877. Text the word immigration to 877-877. Paid for by the Evangelical Immigration Table.

Radio transcript for secular treatment condition

NL: I'm Nick Lilow.

JT: And I'm Joseito Valasquez. Many of our neighbors came here seeking opportunity, but our dysfunctional immigration system breaks up families and causes suffering.

NL: Please join a growing movement asking our political leaders for immigration solutions that:

JT: Respect each person's dignity

NL: Respect the rule of law

JT: Protect family unity

NL: Guarantee secure borders

JT: Ensure fairness to taxpayers

NL: And establish a path toward citizenship

JT: Our state of Colorado elected officials need to hear your voice. Speak out today for common sense and just immigration laws by texting the word immigration to 877-877. Text the word immigration to 877-877.

Follow up questions after hearing radio advertisement

Question 1: Based on what you heard in the advertisement, in what state did the advertisement air? Colorado, California, Georgia, North Dakota, Connecticut, don't know.

Question 2: Prior to listening to the advertisement, did you know that immigration reform was being debated in Congress? Yes / No.

Comparing baseline attitudes

Table 1 presents the distribution of reform support in the control condition. Column 1 shows the main group of interest–white born-again Christians. Comparing these individuals with respondents of all races who do not identify as born-again Christians (column 2), white born agains are noticeably more opposed to immigration reform than their counterparts who are not born-again Christians. Column 2 includes both Christians who are not born-again as well as non-Christians. Comparing columns 1 and 3 reveals that white born-again Christians are also more opposed to immigration reform than their white counterparts who are not born-again Christians.

I also re-scaled the immigration variable to range between 0-1 and computed a series of difference-of-means tests. Comparing columns 1 and 2, the difference of means between the groups is 0.22 (se = 0.05) and the difference of means between columns 1 and 3 is 0.21 (se = 0.05). When comparing attitude differences between columns 2 and 3, however, I find substantively small (0.03) and statistically insignificant differences (se = 0.03, p-value = 0.51). Chi-squared tests of distribution produce identical results. These findings corroborate recent polls that find that religiously-conservative Christians are more opposed to immigration reform relative to the general public.

Table B1: Distribution of support for immigration reform

	(1) White born-again Christians	(2) Not born-again Christians (all races)	(3) Not born-again Christians (whites only)
Strongly oppose	49	22	23
Somewhat oppose	23	21	21
Somewhat support	19	39	38
Strongly support	9	18	17
Total	100%	100%	100%

Notes: Column percentages represent the distribution of immigration attitudes among respondents in the control condition.

EIT has changed specific policy attitudes

To test more directly whether attitudes conformed to the EIT's stated goals, I also asked respondents whether undocumented immigrants should be: offered a pathway to citizenship, allowed to stay in the country legally but not become a citizen, allowed to stay in the country for a limited time before returning to their home countries, or deported back to their home countries. The follow-up question taps into whether the EIT's message increased support for a pathway to citizenship, a contentious part of the immigration reform discussion. I present the results in Figure B1. And consistent with the first set of results, the treatment generally did not affect non born agains, although there is weak evidence that the religious treatment influenced some in this group (p-value = 0.19).

Figure B1: EIT radio ad affects pathway to citizenship

Note: The graphs plot immigration attitudes based treatment condition. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals. The differences and p-values correspond to the difference-in-means estimate between the relevant treatment group and control condition.

In addition to the main dependent variable, respondents were asked more specifically what they think the government policy should be toward immigrants who currently live in the United States without legal documents. The options included deportation, short-term work visas, allowing the immigrants to stay but not allow them to apply for citizenship, and a pathway to citizenship. I show in the paper that white born-again Christians became more supportive of a pathway to citizenship. Here I offer a more difficult test, measuring whether

respondents' support for deporting immigrants currently living in the United States without legal documents changes. This is a more difficult test because the EIT advertisement does not mention deportation explicitly, but the pro-reform message may soften the opposition's opinion while still not transforming it. I find suggestive, although not statistically significant, evidence that the religious treatment decreased the likelihood that respondents support a policy of deportation (difference = -14.49, p-value = 0.14).

Figure B2: EIT advertisement decreases support for deportation

Note: The graph plots immigration attitudes based treatment condition. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals. The differences and p-values correspond to the difference-in-means estimate between the relevant treatment group and the control condition.

Table B2: Experimental treatment effects on different immigration dependent variables

	(1) Stay legally	(2) DREAM Act	(3) American-born children
Secular message	-3	-6	-3
	(7)	(6)	(7)
Religious message	15**	7	17**
	(7)	(7)	(7)
Intercept	29**	44**	35**
	(5)	(5)	(5)
Observations	160	159	152

Notes: The dependent variables are all four-point measures ranging from strongly oppose (0) to strongly support (100). The coefficients are OLS estimates. The intercept represents the average immigration support for respondents in the control condition. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Column 1 replicates the immigration results presented in the paper. Column 2 uses support for the DREAM Act as the dependent variable. Although neither treatment effect produces statistically different results from the control condition, the treatments produce results that are different from each other (religious - secular = 13, p-value = 0.05). Column 3 uses support for allowing immigrants without legal documents who have American-born children in the U.S. to remain legally as the dependent variable. The difference between the religious and secular conditions is 20 (p-value=0.02). * = p<0.1 ** = p<0.05

Table B3: Experimental treatment effects on different religious groups

	(1) White born agains	(2) Non born agains (all religions)	(3) Non born-again Christians	(4) Catholics	(5) Religious non-identifiers
Secular message	-3.32	-2.03	-3.34	-2.31	-0.14
	(7.01)	(2.94)	(5.71)	(6.38)	(4.77)
Religious message	14.05**	2.28	3.46	8.63	-2.12
	(6.73)	(2.96)	(6.39)	(5.94)	(5.13)
Some college	-11.07	1.11	-3.07	12.74*	0.59
	(6.97)	(3.36)	(6.13)	(6.86)	(5.72)
College and above	-0.13	4.39	3.50	11.09	-4.50
	(7.31)	(3.40)	(6.22)	(7.67)	(5.66)
Female	-3.17	-3.47	-4.22	-4.84	-8.04*
	(6.05)	(2.47)	(4.96)	(5.29)	(4.13)
2nd income quartile	-3.25	-1.19	-1.75	-4.83	-2.73
	(7.53)	(3.47)	(7.02)	(7.78)	(5.47)
3rd income quartile	-4.06	-1.37	6.53	-11.43	2.56
	(7.84)	(3.51)	(6.51)	(8.17)	(5.75)
4th income quartile	-1.73	0.49	0.38	-6.13	5.68
	(9.58)	(3.78)	(7.76)	(8.40)	(5.78)
Age	1.14	-1.12**	-1.36	-2.10**	-1.07
	(1.15)	(0.45)	(0.99)	(1.00)	(0.71)
Age-squared	-0.01	0.01*	0.01	0.02	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Moderate	-23.51**	-22.55**	-33.71**	-17.62**	-20.58**
	(10.75)	(2.99)	(6.37)	(7.53)	(4.62)
Conservative	-22.02**	-20.73**	-31.10**	-12.91**	-30.25**
	(10.26)	(3.01)	(6.25)	(5.74)	(5.80)
Intercept	30.61	95.51**	112.16**	111.86**	94.09**
	(30.23)	(9.99)	(24.57)	(21.88)	(15.09)
Observations	157	723	187	178	244

Notes: The dependent variable is a four-point measure of immigration reform support ranging from strongly oppose immigration reform (0) to strongly support immigration reform (100). The coefficients are OLS estimates. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. High school degree or less is the excluded education category. Bottom income quartile is the excluded income category. Liberal is the excluded ideology category.
* = p<0.1 ** = p<0.05

Table B4: Experimental treatment effects differ based on beliefs about the Bible

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	White biblical literalists		Not biblical literalists	
Secular message	0.44	0.94	-4.60	-3.83
	(6.69)	(6.46)	(3.21)	(3.01)
Religious message	12.97*	11.82*	0.48	0.79
	(6.81)	(6.85)	(3.15)	(2.97)
Some college		-0.55		-1.72
		(7.07)		(3.50)
College or above		3.91		2.30
		(6.95)		(3.52)
Female		-1.92		-5.50**
		(5.65)		(2.47)
2nd income quartile		1.97		-2.38
		(7.10)		(3.53)
3rd income quartile		-4.60		-0.06
		(7.18)		(3.59)
4th income quartile		0.54		0.41
		(9.72)		(3.86)
Age		-0.56		-0.94**
		(1.25)		(0.46)
Age-squared		-0.00		0.01
		(0.01)		(0.00)
Moderate		-31.52**		-22.88**
		(8.01)		(3.02)
Conservative		-25.51**		-23.48**
		(7.33)		(3.01)
Intercept	34.48**	86.28**	51.32**	92.11**
	(4.78)	(30.70)	(2.16)	(10.11)
Observations	180	180	685	685

Notes: Columns 1 and 2 look at white respondents who report believing the Bible is the actual word of God. Columns 3 and 4 looks at all respondents who do not report believing the Bible is the actual word of God. The dependent variable is a four-point measure of immigration reform support ranging from strongly oppose immigration reform (0) to strongly support immigration reform (100). The coefficients are OLS estimates. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. High school degree or less is the excluded education category. Bottom income quartile is the excluded income category. Liberal is the excluded ideology category. $* = p<0.1 ** = p<0.05$

Identifying respondents based on "born-again" self-identification versus denominational affiliation in survey experiment

Born-again Christian and evangelical Christian are not synonymous terms. They are two measures coming from different survey questions. Survey respondents self-identify as "born-again Christians" whereas researchers classify respondents as part of religious traditions, such as mainline and evangelical Protestant, based on their reported denominational affiliation. While the majority of self-identified born-again Christians belong to an evangelical religious denomination (71% in the 2012 American National Election Study), not all born-again Christians identify with a denomination that falls under the evangelical umbrella. Empirically, researchers use both categorizations.[4] I consider why a researcher might want to use each of these coding decisions and discuss the implications of these decisions below.

Why might a researcher want to use religious denomination questions to measure whether a respondent is an evangelical? The simple answer to this question is that the paper deals with the Evangelical Immigration Table, a group that consists of leaders from within the broader evangelical community. The evangelical community is so important that Evangelical is in the title of the organization. Moreover, scholars such as Kellstedt et al. (1996) and Steensland et al. (2000) have extensively researched the theology, official doctrine, and other denominational characteristics in order to neatly classify denominations into broader religious traditions, including evangelical Protestantism. In doing so, researchers can classify individuals as evangelical Christians based on their denominational affiliation and can see how evangelical respondents react to messages from evangelical leaders. Additionally, whereas survey respondents may have motivations separate from religion–such as politics– to self identify as an evangelical or born-again Christian or not (Patrikios 2013), church membership is less vulnerable to this sort of expressive responding.

Why might a researcher want to use a single self-identification question instead? While

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[4]Looking specifically at the work done on religion and immigration attitudes, Knoll (2009) and Djupe (2013) use born-again status, Nteta and Wallsten (2012) use denomination, and Jonest et al. (2014) use both categorizations, sometimes collapsing them into a single measure.

the most obvious benefit to this coding decision is its ease and convenience (Smidt, Kellstedt, and Guth 1999), there are other theoretical reasons to employ this line of questioning. First, there is a great deal of diversity both between denominations that make up a religious tradition as well as between congregations of the same denomination (see Djupe and Calfano (2014) and Djupe and Gilbert (2009) for a more detailed discussion of this critique). It would therefore be a mistake to assume that just because a person belongs to a certain church that she is exposed to specific messages or interacts with a certain type of person. Second, when respondents self-identify as a born-again or evangelical Christians they are adopting an identity, whereas they passively receive evangelical denominational identities when researchers classify them based church affiliation. Therefore, researchers can use the born-again Christian measure as an identity measure as they can be certain, rather than assume, the respondent holds a particular identification. Third, the religious denomination questions that are necessary to classify individuals based on religious tradition may be prone to measurement error. The classification scheme is quite specific, with, for example, the American Baptist Association being classified as evangelical and the American Baptist Churches USA being classifed as mainline. It is difficult for scholars to measure the amount of measurement error present, as even multi-wave surveys usually only ask religious denomination once. But the General Social Survey ran a panel study in 2006 and 2008 in which religious denomination was asked in both waves. Approximately 30% of self-identified Protestants changed their denomination in a two-year period. While some of these changes may reflect true changes in affiliation, many of these changes are between denominations with similar names. A single question that relies on self identification instead avoids these pitfalls.

How different do born-again Christians look from evangelicals who do not identify as born again? The 2012 ANES asks a series of questions about immigration attitudes. I compare how born-again Christians (based on self-identification) look from evangelicals (based on religious denomination) who do not report being born-again Christians. In doing so, we can

get a sense of how these different classifications translate into policy preferences. And while the sample is not the same as the SSI survey experiment, the results offer a sense of how similar or different the groups look in the absence of any experimental intervention.

Tables B5, B6, and B7 show the distribution of responses for three survey questions asking about immigration reform. The exact question wordings are available in the question title. The first column presents the results for evangelical Christians who did not report being born again, while the second column looks at respondents who are both evangelical and self identify as born again. Chi-squared tests of distribution are located at the bottom of the tables. Across the questions, there is not much variation in the response patterns. The largest difference in response patterns is in the first policy question. While we would not reject the null hypothestis that there is no difference in the distributions, evangelicals who do not identify as born-again Christians take a slightly more progressive view of immigration reform, with 59% reporting that undocumented immigrants should be able to stay as long as certain conditions are met and penalities apply (53+6=59). In contrast only 53% of evangelicals who are also born-again take one of these positions. There is virtually no difference in attitudes for the other two immigration attitudes.

These results indicate that there is no *a priori* reasons to assume that the measurement of evangelicals and born-again Christians dramatically affects immigration attitudes. This should bring us comfort that different measurement strategies do not lead to different starting positions. These results alone, however, do not suggest how respondents should react to the experimental stimulus. I address this final concern below.

Table B5: Which comes closest to your view about what government policy should be toward unauthorized immigrants now living in the United States?

	evangelical (not born again)	born-again evangelical
Send immigrants home	27	26
Guest worker program	14	21
Remain legally if meet requirements	53	48
Remain legally without penalties	6	5
Total	100%	100%

Notes: Chi-squared = 5.21; pr = 0.16

Table B6: There is a proposal to allow people who were illegally brought into the U.S. as children to become permanent U.S. residents under some circumstances. Specifically, citizens of other countries who illegally entered the U.S. before age 16, who have lived in the U.S. 5 years or longer, and who graduated high school would be allowed to stay in the U.S. as permanent residents if they attend college or serve in the military. From what you have heard, do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose this proposal?

	evangelical (not born again)	born-again evangelical
Favor	45	48
Neither favor or oppose	32	28
Oppose	23	23
Total	100%	100%

Notes: Chi-squared = 0.97; pr = 0.62

Table B7: Some states have passed a law that will require state and local police to determine the immigration status of a person if they find that there is a reasonable suspicion he or she is an undocumented immigrant. Those found to be in the U.S. without permission will have broken state law. From what you have heard, do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose these immigration laws?

	evangelical (not born again)	born-again evangelical
Favor	68	70
Neither favor or oppose	19	16
Oppose	13	14
Total	100%	100%

Notes: Chi-squared = 1.33; pr = 0.52

What are the implications of using born-again status in the survey experiment? The experiment classifies respondents based on their response to a question asking whether they identify as a "born-again Christian or not".[5] In doing so, some respondents classified as born-again Christians may not belong to an evangelical denomination and some evangelicals may not be categorized as being born again.

If we expect born-again Christians who are not evangelicals to respond more strongly to the treatment than evangelicals alone, then this coding decision may lead to artificially large results. If, however, we think evangelicals should be more responsive to the treatment then the experimental results may be smaller using this coding decision. There are two reasons to think that the latter may be the case. First, respondents listened to an advertisement paid for and sponsored by the Evangelical Immigration Table. If we expect evangelical Christians to respond positively to a message from this sponsor, then including non-evangelicals in the born-again sample and excluding evangelicals from the sample would produce a conservative estimate. Second, Smidt, Kellstedt, and Guth (1999) note that born-again status is strongly associated with party identification and vote choice. Moreover, evangelical Christians who also self-identify as born-again Christians are more likely to identify as Republicans and

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[5]Importantly, this question was asked only of respondents who previously self-identified as Christian.

vote for Republican candidates. Given that the experimental stimuli were immigration advertisements encouraging respondents to take a liberal or progressive view on immigration reform, we may expect born-again Christians–by virtue of their closer identification with the Republican Party–to be less persuaded by the message. If so, the results in which treated born-again Christians were more supportive of immigration reform than born-again Christians in the control condition occur *despite* and not *because of* non born-again evangelicals being excluded from the sample.

Online appendix C: E-mail experiment

E-mail details

The e-mails were sent over an eight-week period in 2013. The first e-mail was sent on June 24, 2013; the second e-mail on July 7, 2013; The third on July 16, 2013; the fourth on July 25, 2013; the fifth on August 13, 2013; and the sixth on August 29, 2013. The results presented in the main text of the paper include an e-mail fixed effect to account for the different timings of the e-mail blasts. Moreover, the main results do not rely on an single e-mail being included; re-running the analyses after having dropped each e-mail does not change the results. Finally, analyses that compare the results for the 6-8 piloted subject lines sent at the same time produce the same general trends.

Familiarity with the EIT

The exact levels of evangelicals' familiarity with the EIT is not known, but likely varies based on where people live, they types of churches they attend, and levels of involvement in their religious communities. The EIT had volunteers in specific communities around the country and aired radio advertisements in specific states. Moreover, there is good reason to think that the EIT is not well known at this point. The EIT a relatively new organization, has multiple member organizations that lead the group (including Council for Christian Colleges and Universities, Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention, Korean Church for Community Development, National Association of Evangelicals, National Hispanic Christian Leadership Conference, The Wesleyan Church, World Relief, and World Vision), and has hundreds of signatories of religious leaders. E-mail recipients may therefore have been exposed to the ideas and principles of the EIT without necessarily being familiar with the organization itself.

Given the EIT's recent formation, their targeted advertisement purchases and ground campaign, and their partnership with many other more established religious organizations,

it is quite likely that most evangelicals are not aware of the EIT as an organization. Therefore, many evangelicals may have heard or seen messages consistent with the EIT's goals without being aware of the EIT itself.

How to interpret the field experiment results in light of different levels of familiarity with the EIT.

While there is no accurate estimate of EIT's name recognition, the results still contribute to our understanding of the survey results.

If most evangelicals are unfamiliar with the EIT, the results indicate that evangelicals are less willing to engage with organizations with which they are not familiar, despite the organization having a religious and seemingly credible name. This result highlights that the EIT sponsoring the radio advertisement in the survey experiment was likely a less important source cue than the pastors who delivered the message. If the EIT is unfamiliar to many evangelicals, the results demonstrate that the EIT must rely on a coalition of religious leaders to be successful, as the EIT name appears to be a less credible source cue than either a religious leader (whose familiarity varies) and an unknown individual without a religious title.

If most evangelicals are familiar with the EIT, the results indicate that recipients are not particularly receptive to messages from this group. In this case, evangelicals are aware of the EIT but are less likely to open e-mails from them relative to an individual with a religious title or an unknown individual with no title. Here, the EIT brand name is not useful in and of itself and the EIT must instead rely on religious leaders who are members to influence attitudes.

Regardless of whether evangelicals are or are not familiar with the EIT, the field experiment offers three important insights. First, building on an unanswered question from the survey experiment, the EIT as a source cue is unlikely to have influenced attitudes in the experiment. Second, also building on the survey experiment, the source of a religious message

seems to affect the likelihood that individuals engage with the EIT's message. Therefore, while the EIT's message alone is important, the source of the message can help or hinder the message's intended impact. And third, the EIT's strength comes from having affiliated organizations and support among a large number of religious leaders. Without these groups and individuals, the EIT would have a more difficult time persuading evangelicals' opinions on immigration reform.

E-mail sender affects willingness to participate in solicited activities

We know that an e-mail recipient cannot donate to a cause, sign a petition, or engage in another way unless she first opens the e-mail. But we also may wonder whether the sender of an e-mail has downstream effects on respondents' actions after first conditioning on opening the e-mail.

This section offers suggestive evidence that the initial sender of an e-mail can impact recipients' willingness to take part in a solicited action after opening the e-mail. The piloted e-mails described in the main text of the paper asked respondents to participate in some sort of action. These actions varied across the e-mails, but examples include pledging to be a prayer partner for immigration reform, listening to an advertisement on immigration reform, watching a video on immigration reform, or sharing the EIT's message on social media.

Importantly, the content of the e-mail message remained identical across the sender conditions. For example, regardless of whether the e-mail sender in the subject line was the EIT or Reverend Samuel Rodriguez, the body of the e-mail was a letter from Reverend Rodriguez. Therefore, after conditioning on opening the e-mail, e-mail recipients receive the same information.

Of people who opened the e-mail, approximately 4.2% took part in the solicited activity. There is a fair amount of variation surrounding this estimate, ranging from 1.4% to 8.5%. The variation is much larger than the variation surrounding the estimates for e-mail openings. This is consistent with the e-mail content and solicited requests differing across e-mail blasts

to a much larger extent than the e-mail subject lines.

Among e-mail recipients who received an e-mail from the EIT, the average participation rate was 3.77%. Among e-mail recipients who received an e-mail from an individual, the average participation rate was 5.03%, an increase of 1.26 percentage points (s.e. = 0.23; p-value < 0.01). Just as in the original models, the model specification that produced these reuslts include e-mail pairing fixed effects.

One explanation for these results is that the initial e-mail sender (an individual versus the EIT) changed the composition of e-mail openers, with the types of people who opened an e-mail from the individual being more likely to respond to a solicitation than the types of people who opened an e-mail from the EIT. While the results from these analyses cannot definitively explain why we see these particular set of findings, they highlight that the sender of the e-mail did more than simply change the percent of people who opened the e-mail, it changed rates of behavior among e-mail openers as well.

Unfortunately, these data are not appropriate to compare how e-mails sent by religious leaders and lay people performed. Because the content of the e-mails and the subsequent solicited activities differ markedly across the e-mail blasts, it would be a mistake to infer that different rates of pledging or sharing on social media is a consequence of the sender alone.[6]

Finally, I noted at the beginning of this section that the results are suggestive. I do so because the sample size of e-mail openers within each subject-line combination is small, ranging from 16 to 56.[7] The small sample size in each cell limits the generalizations the data can make. Future research can corroborate these results with more data.

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[6]For curious readers, however, e-mails sent by religious leaders produced higher levels of participation than e-mails sent by those without a religious title.

[7]Employing inverse probability weights to the models produce the same results.

Online Appendix D: Religiosity as a potential moderator

Religiosity in the TAPS data

How might religiosity, or level of religious commitment, affect the reuslts presented in the main text of the paper? While the nature of the data limit the extent to which this question can be answered, I can offer some suggestive evidence on this question.

I first return to the TAPS data to see how white evangelical Republicans' (the main group of interest in the main text) immigration attitudes changed over time as a function of church attendance. To do so, I create a binary measure indicating whether the respondent is a frequent church attender (weekly or more) or not. In an ideal world, I would use a scale measuring religious attendance; however, the sample size and skew prohibits this. Of the white evangelical Republicans in the sample, 39% reoprt attending church less than once a week and the remaining 61% report attending more frequently than once a week. The consequence of this distribution is that there are not enough respondents in each church response option to make meaningful comparisons.

When looking specifically at evangelical Republicans, frequent attenders shifted in their average attitudes to become 13.03 points more supportive of immigration reform between waves 1 and 3 (p-value = 0.006). Among infrequent attenders, there is no divergence in attitudes between waves 1 and 3 (-0.92; p-value = 0.920).[8]

Table D1 replicates the main results from the paper separately for infrequent attenders (column 1) and frequent attenders (column 2) in which I compare the attitude trajectories of white evangelical Republicans and other Republicans. Among infrequent church attenders, white evangelical Republicans and other Republicans did not diverge dramatically in their immigration attitudes between waves 1 and 3 (5.30; se = 6.96). In contrast, a gap developed among frequent attenders between waves 1 and 2 (11.43; se = 6.59) and continued to grow. The resultant attitudinal gap between white evangelical Republicans and other Republicans

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[8]The results using the full sample of evangelical Republicans produced a gap of 9.68 between waves 1 and 3 (p-value = 0.003).

widened by 18.39 points between waves 1 and 3 (se = 7.61). Column 3 formally tests whether the changes over time between white evangelical Republicans and other Republicans are the same or different for infrequent and frequent church attenders. Here, the results are suggestive rather than definitive. The triple interaction (wave 3 * white evan * church) yields a p-value of 0.221; I therefore cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference in changes over time for frequent and infrequent attenders. The statistical insignificance is likely a function of the model being underpowered.

One interpretation of these suggestive results is that frequent evangelical attenders became more supportive over time relative to less frequent evangelical attenders because they were exposed to the pro-reform message through churches and other religious networks and media. This is consistent with Nteta and Wallsten (2012) who use cross-sectional data to show that exposure to pro-immigration messages corresponds with more liberal immigration attitudes. While this explanation comports with the assumption that more religious individuals are more likely to hear religious messages through their religious communities, I do not have measures of exposure to the EIT's messages or knowledge of the EIT. It is therefore possible that another mechanism is at work. But the results indicate that not only is something changing between white evangelical Republicans and other Republicans, and this change is most pronounced among evangelical Republicans who are most likely to hear pro-reform messages, either from the EIT directly or indirectly through their religious leaders and community members.

Importantly, the frequent church attenders who "drive" the overall results represent the majority of evangelicals in the sample. Due to their high levels of religiosity, most evangelical Christians in the same attend church weekly or more (61%). Rather than a small group of individuals changing their opinions so dramatically that this group changes the overall average, the results indicate that religious individuals–making up the majority of evangelicals–produced the change over time.

Table D1: Church attendance as a potential moderator

	(1) Infrequent attenders	(2) Frequent attenders	(3) All evangelical Christians
Wave 2	2.73	0.02	2.73
	(5.49)	(3.19)	(5.47)
Wave 3	4.82	-4.27	4.82
	(5.51)	(3.80)	(5.49)
White evangelical	0.30	-12.18	0.30
	(8.47)	(8.79)	(8.45)
Wave 2 * White evangelical	-1.96	11.43*	-1.96
	(7.02)	(6.59)	(6.99)
Wave 3 * White evangelical	5.30	18.39**	5.30
	(6.96)	(7.61)	(6.94)
Regular church attender			4.47
			(7.12)
White evan * church			-12.48
			(12.20)
Wave 2 * church			-2.71
			(6.95)
Wave 3 * church			-9.09
			(7.09)
Wave 2 * white evan * church			13.39
			(10.30)
Wave 3 * white evan * church			13.09
			(10.66)
Intercept	36.04**	40.51**	36.04**
	(6.04)	(3.80)	(6.02)
R^2	0.013	0.012	0.012
Observations	307	474	781

Notes: The sample includes Republicans only. The dependent variable is a five-point measure of immigration reform support ranging from strongly oppose immigration reform (0) to strongly support immigration reform (100). The coefficients are OLS estimates. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * = p<0.1 ** = p<0.05

Religiosity in the survey experiment

Does a respondent's level of religious commitment moderate the treatment effects uncovered in the experiment? Table D2 presents models that interact the treatment variables with being

a regular church attender. Just as with the TAPS data, the sample size and skew make it difficult to look at the relationship between the treatment conditions and immigration attitudes across a four- or five-point church attendance scale. Instead, I create a binary measure indicating whether the respondent is a regular church attender (almost every week or every week; coded as 1) compared to those who attend less frequently (coded as 0).

The first column of Table D2 shows the results for white born-again Christians who do not attend church at least weekly. Here, I find evidence that respondents in the religious condition reported more support for immigration reform relative to those in the control condition, and the substantive size of the effect is comparable to that of the full sample presented in the main text of the paper. Due to the small sample size, however, the results do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance (p-value = 0.16). The second column presents the same results for born-again Christians who attend church weekly or more. The effect sizes appear roughly similar in Columns 1 and 2, although the treatment effect of the religious message is statistically significant at the 0.10 level in the high-attendance group. Moreover, the two church attendance groups have similar baseline levels of reform support in the control condition (32 in low-attendance group; 27 in the high-attendance group), indicating that born-again Christians of all church-attendance levels have a generally low level of initial immigration support. Finally, Column 3 presents an interaction model to test whether the treatments had different effects based on church attendance levels. I do not find evidence of this.

The results, while surprising to some, comport with existing literature on cues. Adkins, Layman, and Campbell (2013) find that there is no difference in more-committed and less-committed evangelicals' responses to cues from their tradition's leaders. The authors argue that "many devoted adherents already have internalized the norms and perspectives of their traditions, thus limiting the impact of the cues in our experiment" (246). Evangelical Christians, according to the authors, are part of a strict religious community and even the less-strong adherents may have internalized the group's norms prior to the experiment.

This is why hearing messages that are consonant with the group's general position does not correspond with a change in evangelical Christians' reported attitudes. In the same manner, born-again Christians–by virtue of this identification–may be more persuaded by a religious message, irrespective of their own levels of religiosity. Although these results align with previous findings on evangelicals taking cues from leaders, it is important to reiterate that my results are suggestive. I only have one measure of religious commitment–church attendance–and can only divide respondents into two groups, and even this decision leaves us with a smaller-than-ideal sample size. Instead, these results are suggestive that born-again Christians of all levels of religiosity may be responsive to the EIT's message, so long as they are exposed.

Table D2: Church attendance as a potential moderator

	(1) Less frequent attenders	(2) Frequent attenders	(3) All born-again Christians
Secular message	-5.65	-1.67	-5.65
	(10.79)	(8.61)	(10.73)
Religious message	15.09	14.52*	15.09
	(10.70)	(8.64)	(10.64)
Regular church attender			-4.20
			(9.93)
Secular message X church			3.99
			(13.78)
Religious message X church			-0.56
			(13.73)
Intercept	31.58**	27.38**	31.58**
	(7.40)	(6.63)	(7.36)
Observations	62	98	160

Notes: The sample includes white born-again Christians only. The dependent variable is a four-point measure of immigration reform support ranging from strongly oppose immigration reform (0) to strongly support immigration reform (100). The coefficients are OLS estimates. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * = p<0.1 ** = p<0.05

Taking the panel and experimental data together show two trends. In the panel data, more frequent church attendance is correlated with becoming more supportive of immigra-

tion reform over time. In contrast, there is no evidence that church attendance moderates the experimental treatment. These results suggest that when exposed to pro-reform EIT messages, born-again Christians of all levels of religiosity may respond to a similar degree. But, it's unlikely that we would see a shift among less involved evangelicals in the real world, at least over a short time period. It is not necessarily the case that these individuals reject or ignore the pro-reform messages, but rather they are less likely to be exposed to the information in the real world. In an experimental setting, however, variation in religiosity does not predict whether these messages are accepted and internalized.